INTRODUCTION
One of the strengths of the American higher education system is its competitive nature. Colleges and universities compete for faculty, for students, for external research funding and on the athletic fi elds. Given the wide publicity that the U.S. News & World Reports annual rankings of colleges and universities receive and the importance of student selectivity in these rankings, American colleges and universities are increasingly using merit aid as a vehicle to attract students with higher test scores and thus to improve their rankings (McPherson & Schapiro, 1998 Duffy & Goldberg, 1998; Ehrenberg, forthcoming) .
It is well known that test scores are correlated with students' socio-economic backgrounds. Hence, to the extent that colleges are successful in "buying" higher test-score students, one should expect that their enrollment of students from families in the lower tails of the family income distribution should decline. However, somewhat surprisingly, there have been no efforts to test if this is occurring.
Our paper presents such a test. While institutional-level data on the dollar amounts of merit scholarships offered by colleges and universities are not available, data are available on the number of National Merit Scholarship (NMS) winners attending an institution on scholarships that have been funded by the institution itself, rather than the National Merit Scholarship Corporation (NMSC). These institutional scholarships are awarded to high-test-score students only if they attend the institution. Our research strategy was to estimate whether an increase in the number of recipients of these scholarships at an institution is associated with a decline in the number of students from lower-and lower-middle-income families attending the institution, while holding other factors constant. We measured the number of these students by the number of Pell Grant recipients attending the institution.
The second section of our paper briefl y describes the National Merit Scholarship and the federal Pell Grant programs. Next, we describe our analytical approach, followed by our empirical fi ndings and some brief concluding remarks.
THE NATIONAL MERIT SCHOLARSHIP AND PELL GRANT PROGRAMS
The National Merit Scholarship Program (www.nationalmerit.org) began in 1955. High school students qualify for awards based on their scores on the PSAT examination, high school records, letters of recommendation, information about the students' activities and leadership, and personal essays.
Three types of NMS awards exist. The fi rst is a set of scholarships awarded to top students independent of family fi nancial circumstances by the NMSC itself; these awards currently are $2,500 scholarships for one year of college at only institutions to which the winner has been admitted. The second is a set of scholarships awarded by corporations to top students who are employees of the corporations, children of employees, residents of a community in which the corporations have operations, or students pursuing college majors or careers in which the corporations have a special interest. These scholarships may either be for one year of study or can be renewable for four years. Again there is no restriction on the college or university that the student may attend.
The fi nal type, and the focus of our attention, is the NMS awards funded by colleges and universities. Finalists in the NMS competition notify the NMSC of their fi rst-choice college or university, and the NSMC in turn notifi es the institution. Each institution that offers this type of award makes awards to a subset of the fi nalists who have indicated that they wish to attend the institution. Crucially, an award is cancelled if the student decides not to attend the institution. Hence, these awards are contingent on attending the institution.
These college-and university-funded awards are renewable for up to four years of undergraduate study and provide stipends that range from $500 to $2,000 a year. Awards of this amount pale when compared to the $30,000 tuition and fee levels that are now common at the nation's most selective private colleges and universities. However, previous research has indicated that offering a top student a named scholarship enhances the likelihood that a student will attend an institution (Avery & Hoxby, 2004) . In addition, it is likely that institutions offering NMS awards will also offer additional merit aid to students; hence, the dollar amount of the NMS awards likely understates the amount of merit aid that the recipients receive from the institution. 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003 1 Many of these institutions are among the small number of colleges and universities that still employ need-blind admissions and need-based fi nancial aid policies. A number of them accordingly offer no college-and university-funded NMS awards. However, even in this group of 100 institutions, the percentage of NMS awards funded by the institutions themselves rose from 41.5% in 1983 to about 55.5% at the turn of the 21st century. Table 2 provides information for each year during our sample period on the numbers of institution-funded and noninstitution-funded NMS students at these institutions at the 25th percentile, 50th percentile (median), 75th percentile, and mean institution in our top 100 sample. The total number of NMS students increases at each point in the distribution; this increase is at least partially due to the way the institutions were selected (top 100 in 2003). What stands out, however, is that virtually all of the growth in the number of NMS winners occurred in the institution-funded category. For example, the mean number of institutional funded awards in the sample rose from 17 in 1983 to 37 in 2003. As late as 1995-1996, the 25th percentile institution (in terms of total number of NMS awards in 2003) offered no institution-funded NMS awards. By 2003 , however, the 25th percentile institution in the group offered 12 institutionally funded NMS awards.
Our interest is in how the growth of merit scholarships has infl uenced the proportion of students from lower-and lower-middle-income families attending selective institutions. While the U.S. Department of Education does not collect institution-level data on the family income distribution of students, data on the number of Pell Grant recipients at each institution are collected annually.
1
The lower enrollment shares in earlier years are an artifact of how the panel was constructed. This occurs because there is some variation in the institutions that appear in the top 100 list from year to year. The Pell Grant program is the largest need-based fi nancial aid program in the United States; it provided about $12.6 billion dollars in funding to 5.1 million undergraduate students in 2003 (Trends, 2004 . Eligibility for Pell Grants for a dependent student is based on a dependent student's family income and wealth, the number of siblings in college, and the expected costs of attending the institution; for independent students, eligibility is based on the income of the student and his or her spouse. According to Neil Seftor and Sarah Turner (2002) , throughout the 1990s, half of Pell Grant recipients were independent students, although this fraction is likely to be much lower in the selective institutions that are in our sample where most students are full-time students. Prior to 1993, awards were also constrained to be less than 60% of the costs of attending an institution. Some students who attended low-cost institutions were excluded from participating in the Pell Grant program for this reason.
Data from the 2002-2003 Title IV/Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year
Report indicate that in that academic year, 87% of all Pell Grant recipients at four-year public institutions came from families with family incomes of $40,000 or less; the comparable fi gure at four-year private institutions was 86.6% (2002) (2003) Title IV, Table 2A ). Hence, the share of Pell Grant recipients among an institution's undergraduate student body is a good proxy for the share of its students coming from lower-and lower-middleincome families. Jeffrey Tebbs and Sarah Turner (2005) caution that the Pell Grant recipient data refer to students attending an institution anytime during a year, while IPEDs enrollment data refer to a point of time in the fall. Hence, other factors held constant, if turnover of students is high at an institution during the year, the "share" of Pell Grant recipients at the institution will appear artifi cially high. We control for this problem in the empirical work that follows by including institutional fi xed effects in our estimation models. Table 3 presents information, by year, on the mean ratio of the number of Pell Grant recipients at an institution to the number of full-time undergraduates attending the institution for the 100 institutions in our sample during the 1983 to 2000 period. The column headed "unweighted" presents information on the average percentage across institution, while the column headed "weighted" is a weighted average, with the enrollments used as weights. These data suggest that the percentage of Pell Grant recipients among the undergraduate students at these institutions fl uctuated but gradually increased during the period.
This increase tells us little about the impact of the growth of institutionally funded NMS at these institutions on the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institutions during the period; the share of Pell Grant recipients at these 
Year
Unweighted Weighted full-time students that year. For the institutions in our sample, part-time students represent only 12.6% of all students, and using total undergraduate students in the denominator of our ratio does not change the trends reported above or any of the econometric results that follow. We also caution that only U.S. citizens and permanent residents are eligible for Pell Grants. Thus, if an institution enrolls a high fraction of foreign students, its Pell Grant ratio will, other factors held constant, appear low.
institutions will vary over time as the income distribution of the populations changes, as eligibility rules change, as maximum award levels change and as tuition levels at the institutions change. Hence, to analyze the impact of changes in the number of NMS recipients on the number of Pell Grant recipients, we must control for these other factors in our analyses.
ANALYTIC APPROACH
Our goal is to see how the number of institutionally fi nanced new NMS winners (M t ) at an institution infl uence the number of Pell Grant recipients (P t ) at the institution, other factors being held constant. A problem that immediately presents itself is that the number of NMS winners refers to entering fi rst-year students, while the number of Pell Grant recipients refers to all enrolled undergraduates. If we had data on the number of Pell Grant recipients who were fi rst-year students at an institution, we would use this information and information on the number of new fi rst-year students at the institution to construct the fraction of fi rst-year students who were Pell Grant recipients at the institution and then estimate how changes in the number of NMS winners affected that ratio. However, Pell Grant data are not available at the institutional level by the year that the student is enrolled in college.
A solution to this problem is possible if we make some very strong and admittedly unrealistic assumptions. Specifi cally, if one is willing to assume for simplicity that all students at the institution enter as fi rst-year students, that no students drop out before graduation, that students' Pell Grant eligibility does not change during the years they are enrolled in college, and that all students who graduate do so in four years, then the following relationship holds
(1) P it = p it + p it-1 + p it-2 + p it-3. Here p it is the number of new fi rst-year Pell Grant recipients who enroll at the institution in year t. Put simply, the total number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution in year t is the sum of the number of new fi rst-year Pell grant recipients that enrolled at the institution in year t and in each of the three preceding years. If one writes down the equivalent expression for P it-1 and then subtracts it from P it , one fi nds that (2) P it -P it-1 = p it -p it-4. Given the assumptions that we have made, the difference between the number of Pell Grant recipients at an institution in year t and year t-1 is the difference between the numbers of fi rst-year Pell Grant recipients in year t and year t-4. Hence, if we want to estimate how changes in the number of NMS infl uence changes in the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution between years t and t-1, the correct change in the number of NMS win-ners to use is the difference between M t and M t-4 . So the dependent variable in our econometric analyses is based on one-year changes in the numbers of Pell Grant recipients, while our explanatory variable is based on four-year changes in the number of institutionally funded NMS winners.
Our empirical approach is to use our institutional-level panel data to estimate equations in which the one-year change in the ratio of the number of Pell Grant recipients to the number of full-time undergraduate students at an institution is specifi ed as a linear function of the four-year change in the share of fi rst-year full-time undergraduate students who receive institutionally fi nanced NMS awards at the institution, institutional fi xed effects, year fi xed effects, and a random error term.
(3) (P it /F it ) -(P it-1 /F it-1 ) = a 0 + a 1 ((M it /N it ) -(M it-4 /N it-4 )) + u i + v t + e it Here F it is the number of full-time enrolled undergraduates at institution i in year t, N it is the number of full-time fi rst-year students enrolled at institution i in year t, the a 0 and a 1 are parameters, the u i are the institutional fi xed effects, the v t are the year fi xed effects, and the e it is a random error term. We include the institutional fi xed effects in the model to control for institution-specifi c factors other than changes in the number of NMS award winners that might affect the change in the share of Pell Grant recipients at an institution. The year fi xed effects are included to control for changes in national factors that might affect the share of Pell Grant recipients over time; these factors include changes in the distribution of family income of college-age students, changes in Pell Grant eligibility and generosity rules, and changes in Pell Grant funding levels.
The Pell Grant and NMS variables have each been defl ated by a relevant size variable (total full-time undergraduate students or total full-time fi rst year students) to control for changes in the size of each institution over time. Because part-time students enrolled for at least one-half of a normal full-time load are eligible to receive Pell Grants, in the empirical work in the next section, we also experiment with defl ating the Pell grant and NMS variables by the total number of undergraduate students and the total number of fi rst-year students at the institution.
Finally, we should note that our use of the one-year change in the number of Pell Grant recipients at an institution to measure the four-year change in the number of freshman Pell Grant recipients at an institution will probably be subject to substantial measurement error because of the set of strict assumptions that we had to make to derive this equivalence. However, if the measurement error is random, it will only increase the imprecision of our estimates; it will not bias the coeffi cient of the NMS variable. Table 4 summarizes our initial estimates of equation (3). The coeffi cients in the table are estimates of the parameter a 1 that come from four different model specifi cations. The fi rst is based on the total number of new NMS recipients at an institution, regardless of the source of funding. The second is based on the number of institutionally funded NMS recipients. The third is based on the number of NMS recipients at the institution who are not funded by the institution. The fi nal specifi cation includes both the number of institutionally funded NMS and the number of NMS recipients funded in other ways as explanatory variables. For each specifi cation, we present estimated coeffi cients for models that excluded and included year fi xed effects; the estimates are not very sensitive to these variables. The panel used in this estimation uses four years of NMS recipient data (1983, 1987, 1991 , and 1995) so we have three change observations for each institution in the sample.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
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The coeffi cients in row 1 suggest that increasing the ratio of new NMS award winners, irrespective of source of funding, at an institution to the size of the institution's fi rst-year full-time student body reduces the ratio of the institution's number of Pell Grant recipients to its full-time undergraduate enrollments. If the sizes of the institution's fi rst-year full-time student body and its full-time undergraduate enrollments remain constant, the interpretation of the coeffi cients are that an increase in NMS awards of 10 at an institution is associated with a reduction in the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution of about two.
When we restrict our attention to the number of institutional funded NMS, the magnitude of the reduction is doubled to a reduction of four Pell Grant recipients for every 10 additional institutionally funded NMS award winners, again holding constant full-time freshman and full-time total undergraduate enrollment levels. Indeed, when we restrict our attention to NMS winners not funded by the institution in row 3, an increase in the number of these winners at an institution has no statistically significant effect on the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution. This fi nding is confi rmed in the coeffi cients from the last model (row 4). When we included both the number of institutionally fi nanced and other NMS award recipients as explanatory variables, only increases in the former have a negative effect on the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution.
Put simply, in our sample of institutions, other factors held constant, including the total full-time undergraduate and fi rst-year enrollment levels, offering more institutionally funded NMS awards is associated with fewer Pell Grant recipients attending the institution; and the magnitude of the reduction is roughly four fewer Pell Grant recipients for each 10 additional institutional NMS recipients enrolled at the institution. Table 5 presents estimates of coeffi cients from the models in Table 4 that included year fi xed effects, in which the models were estimated for various subgroups of our sample. In particular, we present estimates for the entire sample (the same as in table 4), for the top 80 institutions in terms of the number of Pell Grant recipients in 2003, for the top 60 institutions, for the top 40 institutions, for the top 20 institutions, and for the top 10 institutions. These analyses confi rm that only the institutionally fi nanced and awarded NMS adversely infl uence the number of Pell Grant recipients at an institution. However, the magnitude of this displacement effect varies by institution. In particular, the magnitude of the displacement effect increases as we move from the top 100 institutions, to the top 80, down to the top 10 (in terms of total number of Pell Grant recipients in 2003). It is at institutions with the largest number of Pell Grant recipients that the displacement of Pell Grant recipients by institutionally funded NMS recipients is the largest. Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that, other factors held constant, at the top 10 institutions, every additional institution- Table 5 separately for public and private institutions. The pattern of displacement effects for the private institutions was very similar to those for the entire sample; the coeffi cients of the institutional NMS variable were indistinguishable for each subgroup between private institutions and for the overall sample (reported in Table 5 ). In contrast, the displacement effects of increasing institutional NMS awards at public institutions were not signifi cantly different from zero when we used the top 80 and top 100 samples. This fi nding suggests that, at public institutions that are not in the top institutions in 2005 in terms of total NMS recipients, we fi nd no evidence that Pell Grant recipients are displaced by institutionally funded NMS recipients.
Second, we replicated the analyses found in Table 5 , adding data for 1999 to the sample. Because IPEDS did not collect 1999 enrollment data, we estimated the 1999 number of full-time, fi rst-year students for each institution by the average of the 1998 and 2000 values of this variable for each institution. We found that, even with the measurement error induced by this method, our estimates of the displacement effects of increasing the number of institutionally sponsored NMS recipients at an institution on the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution were roughly of the same order of magnitude as those found in Table 5 .
Third, part-time students attending an institution at least half-time are eligible to receive Pell Grants. While we do not know the number of part-time students at each institution each year who meet this criteria, we experimented with either including part-time students in the total enrollment fi gures that make up the denominator of the dependent variable in equation (3), including part-time, fi rst-year students in the total fi rst-year enrollment fi gure that make up the denominator of the explanatory variables in equation (3), or doing both simultaneously. None of these changes substantially affected the fi ndings that we have reported so far.
Finally, we divided our sample into institutions that experienced increases in total full-time enrollments during both the 1987-1991 and 1991-1995 periods and all other institutions. We estimated variants of the models a Using panel data for 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995 that underlie Table 4 for both groups. We found that a strong statistically signifi cant negative relationship exists between the change in the ratio of institutionally funded NMS to the number of full-time, fi rst-year students and the change in the ratio of the number of Pell Grant recipients to the total full-time undergraduates enrolled at the institution only at the "growing" ones. Thus, the displacement of Pell Grant recipients by institutionally awarded NMS recipients in our sample appears to occur only at institutions with growing enrollments and largely refl ects a change in the share of Pell Grant recipients in the student body, not always an absolute decline in the number of Pell grant recipients.
CONCLUSION
Our study has provided the evidence that, with other factors being held constant, an increase in the share of institutionally funded NMS students in a college or university's fi rst-year class is associated with a reduction in the share of Pell Grant recipients among the undergraduate student body at the institution. The magnitude of this displacement effect is largest at the institutions in our sample that enroll the greatest number of NMS students, and it occurs primarily in institutions whose enrollment is growing. We stress that we have observed this displacement effect, as we expected, only for institutionally sponsored NMS; we do not observe any displacement of Pell Grant recipients if an institution is able to increase the number of NMSC-or company-sponsored recipients that it enrolls. Those NMS winners who receive their awards regardless of their choice of institution do not appear to displace any student from lower-income families when they enroll at an institution.
While our research has focused only on NMS awards, it highlights the trade-off that may exist more broadly between using institutional grant aid to craft a more selective student body than would otherwise occur and using institutional grant aid to attract more students from families from the lower tail of the family income distribution. If selective institutions, especially public ones, are committed to serving students from all socioeconomic backgrounds, these institutions must track the share of their students who receive Pell grants and have as goals both socioeconomic diversity and student selectivity. Without concerted efforts by these institutions to increase the representation of students from lower-and lower-middle-income families in their student ranks, current inequalities in the distribution of students attending these institutions by family income class are likely to persist or worsen over time (Bowen, Kurzweil, & Tobin, 2005) .
